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The  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  investigate  the  short-term  joint  dynamics  of  productivity  and 
employment during the economic down cycles in the EU economies over the past 20 years. 
Disentangling the shift in labour demand into a change of employment-productivity schedule 
and a movement along it, we focus on the last 2-3 crises, highlighting the peculiarities of the last 
recession. Namely, we demonstrate that many of the EU countries – unlike the United States –do 
not follow the RBC pattern. We also suggest some possible institutional fundamentals that could 
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1. Introduction 
The joint dynamics of employment and productivity are of crucial importance especially in the 
short-term perspective. Reductions in labour demand which produce increases in unemployment lead 
to political pressure frequently resulting in policy instruments designed to address the demands of the 
voters. The timing between the processes and the policy measures of crisis management has been 
changing  over  the  past  decades,  with  the  attempt  to  devise  and  implement  so-called  pro-active 
policies. The pressure is stronger if other countries already adopt similar policies (Mukand and Rodrik, 
2005).  However,  in  some  cases  such  efforts  may  not  only  be  premature  but  also  useless,  as  the 
employment  response  may  differ,  depending  on  the  institutional  design  (including  labour  market 
flexibility, active and passive labour market policies) as well as the depth and the duration of the down 
cycle.  
In this paper we shed some light on the short-run joint employment-productivity dynamics in 
the EU economies. Analysing the period of the past two decades we follow the RBC-based approach of 
Mulligan (2009). We decompose changes in employment into the shift of the labour demand schedule 
and the movement along it. The actual combination of both types of adjustment – movement along the 
schedule and the shift of the schedule – provides very characteristic adjustment for many of the EU 
countries. On the basis of the institutional framework and the nature of economic slowdowns we are 
able to provide economic justification to the emerging groupings of the EU economies. We document 
the peculiarities associated with the recent global economic recession.  
We identify three main groups of adjustments and countries (the fourth group consists of 
countries that in fact have proven resistant to the recent recession). First, countries with internal 
institutions fostering the stability of the enterprise sector are naturally more immune to externally 
driven  shocks  and  thus  do  not  seem  to  require  any  dedicated instruments,  at  least  in  the  recent 
recession. In these countries companies can afford to initially follow “labour hoarding” patterns, and if 
that  does  not  prove  to  be  a  satisfactory  strategy,  reduction  in  employment  is  moderate  and 
productivity recovery follows. Second, in countries experiencing extremely strong negative shocks, 
employment and productivity adjustments are considerable and cannot be contained under the fiscal 
constraints. Such crises, however, do not follow a typical RBC pattern and consist of stark reductions in 
both  employment  and  productivity.  In  the  third  group  of  analysed  cases,  countries  have  adopted 
policies intended to address the negative employment adjustments, but the subsequent productivity 
loss has been substantial. Recovery is likely to be much slower in these cases. 
The policy implications of this empirical exercise are clear. First, before any actual policy is 
adopted, governments should identify the most probable type of adjustment the economy is expected 
to follow and observe where the instruments already implemented are sufficient. Second, some long-
term stable solutions are more reliable than recently popular “crisis packages”. Whether they are 
additional “automatic stabilisers” or pro-active safety nets, adverse labour market adjustments in such 
environments are weaker on the employment side and less detrimental to productivity dynamics.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. In Section 3 
we discuss in detail the method and the data used, before analysing and discussing the main empirical 
results. The concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.  
   3 
2. Literature review 
  This  review  is  articulated  in  three  sub-sections.  First  we  analyze  the  links  between 
employment and productivity, especially from a business cycle standpoint (2.1). Then we consider the 
main features of business cycles in Europe (2.2). Lastly we illustrate the key characteristics and labour 
market effects of the last global crisis (2.3). 
 
2.1. Employment and productivity: key empirical studies  
Many of  the empirical studies concerning the links between economic dynamics and labour 
market performance refer to the so-called Okun’s law (e.g. see Padalino and Vivarelli, 1997; Lee, 2000).  
The intensity of the relation – i.e. the “Okun’s coefficient”1 – varies between countries and is unstable 
over time, depending on structural conditions and the legislative framework (especially concerning 
the labour market institutions), reflecting in particular the “labour hoarding” practices2. Moreover, 
there are many difficulties in detecting a stable threshold of GDP growth rate that allows a decline in 
unemployment and an increase in employment as opposed to so-called “jobless growth”. 
The timing of the labour market response may also be relevant. For example, the IMF (2010, 
chapter 3) shows that the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in output has increased 
over time in many countries, as a consequence of less strict employment protection and greater use of 
temporary employment contracts. However, it has been estimated that in normal recessions it takes 
three quarters after output has begun to recover for employment to start increasing and an additional 
two  quarters  for  the  unemployment  rate  to  peak.  Thus,  the  evolutions  of  employment  and 
unemployment  patterns  are  not  necessarily  alike.  Unemployment  can  continue  rising  even  after 
employment growth has turned positive. 
  Another  important  factor  concerns  the  symmetry  of  the  response.  If  the  adjustments  in 
employment or unemployment were symmetric in the response to the output growth changes, higher 
responsiveness of unemployment to changes in output should help in the recovery subsequent to the 
recession.  However,  Arpaia  and  Curci  (2010)  have  detected  an  asymmetry  over  the  cycle,  with 
recessions  being  characterised  by  more  job  destruction  than  by  job  creation  in  the  following 
recoveries. 
Analysing  the  co-movement  between  output  and  employment  yields,  we  can  gain,  at  least 
indirectly, some insights into productivity dynamics. Whenever “labour hoarding” practices prevail, 
productivity may actually decline (or its growth rate decelerate) at least in the short run3. In the next 
phase  of  the  cycle,  “labour  hoarding”  may result  in a  larger  productivity  gain.  The  causes of  this 
“productivity dividend” are suitably explained by Fulco (1984, p. 3): “When demand begins to revive, 
output can often be boosted without causing commensurate increases in the payroll. Firms respond by 
                                                
1  Note  that  during  a  recession  a  decline  in  (the  growth  of)  GDP  causes  a  decline  in  labour  demand  and 
employment,  hence  an  increase  in  unemployment  (Keynesian  unemployment  due  to  a  lack  of  aggregate 
demand);  the  rise  in  unemployment  can  however  be  partly  reinforced  by  "wage  rigidities"  (i.e.  classical 
unemployment). 
2 Because of hiring and firing costs, the firms may be willing to hoard labour if the shock hitting the economy 
appears to be transitory. However, as the recession deepens, firms may consider the shock to be more persistent 
and may start to fire at a faster pace. 
3 An indirect consequence is that nominal unit labour costs are bound to increase, despite a deceleration in wage 
dynamics (compensations per employee will adjust, at least in the variable component), as shown by Arpaia and 
Curci  (2010).  The  resulting  loss  of  competitiveness  will  dampen  foreign  demand  and  exports,  especially  in 
countries – such as the European ones – that cannot benefit from large increases in domestic demand (because of 
fiscal and macroeconomic adjustments). This in turn will deteriorate the recovery prospects.   4 
using some idle plants and equipment and by redirecting existing labour to production-related tasks. This 
results in the rapid productivity gains […].” Fulco also clarifies that "hoarded employees may be those 
with the greatest seniority, experience, and training specific to the firm's needs”, which will further 
contribute to increases in productivity.  
It is also quite self-explanatory that this phenomenon is of a short-run nature (e.g. Beaudry and 
Collard, 2002; Becker and Gordon, 2008). In particular, Pichelmann and Roeger (2008) consider this 
potential  trade-off  within  the  Lisbon  Strategy.  Belorgey  et  al.  (2006)  show  that  employment  rate 
changes  negatively  affect  the  productivity  growth  rate,  supporting  the  hypothesis  of  “diminishing 
returns  for  the  employment  rate”.  Moreover,  Rutkowski  (2006)  highlights  that  low-productivity 
employment  in  the  CIS  is  a  mirror  image  of  unemployment  in  the  European  transition  countries 
(where a developed social safety net exists). 
In  the  medium  run,  a  trade-off  between  employment and  productivity  is  just  one  possible 
outcome, but other possibilities may occur. For example, Marelli and Signorelli (2010) identify four 
different “models of growth” for EU countries in the last two decades: intensive, extensive, virtuous 
and stagnant4. In Eastern Europe, all centrally planned economies followed an “extensive” model (high 
employment rate and low productivity level/dynamics) before the beginning of transition in the early 
1990s;  rationalisations  and  the  restructuring  of  their  economies  then  significantly  reduced 
employment  rates  (often  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the  shadow  economy  and  irregular 
employment) but with (more or less) relevant productivity gains5. On the other hand, many “old EU” 
countries have moved in the opposite direction since the mid 1990s: coming from two decades of 
“jobless growth”, they  have shifted to an “extensive” growth model. For instance, Italy and Spain, 
following  some  reforms  introducing  greater  flexibility  in  labour  markets,  benefited  from  a 
considerable increase in employment rates6, but accompanied by a worsening of productivity (many 
new jobs have been unskilled and low-wage, in many cases occupied by immigrant workers). 
Finally, it is widely recognized that in the long run a sustained productivity growth is beneficial 
also in preserving and expanding employment. “Growth accounting” approaches have tried to compute 
the contribution of different resources (capital, labour, human capital, etc.) to growth. 7 
 
2.2 Business cycles in the EU 
A  preliminary  consideration  is  that,  in  the  world,  business  cycles  have  been  surprisingly 
synchronised across countries over the past two decades. This fact, together with the “opening” of 
countries and the increasing trade flows, is one of the most evident effects of globalization.8 Kose, 
                                                
4 The paper has also provided econometric corroboration of the “diminishing returns for the employment rate” 
hypothesis. 
5 The employment rate inverted its tendency to decline only a few years after the huge "transitional recession" of 
the early 1990s. It should be noted that, as for transition countries, the last 2007-08 crisis determined a second 
negative "job shock" in less than a generation. 
6  The  “end  of  eurosclerosis”  (see  Boeri  and  Garibaldi,  2009)  has  however  been  unbalanced,  because  of  the 
diffusion  of  temporary  contracts,  the  spreading  of  “dual  labour  markets”  and  the  consequent  effects  on  the 
(differentiated) productivity and wage dynamics. 
7 This approach is sometimes also followed in business cycle studies. For example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan 
(2006)  find  that  both  in  the  Great  Depression  and  in  the  1982  recession  the  efficiency  and  labour  wedges 
together accounted for essentially all the fluctuations. 
8 The clearest example is the “Great Recession” which in 2008-09– after the financial crisis – hit all countries in 
the world (although for China, India and other emerging economies there was just a slight deceleration in their 
previous growth rates).   5 
Prasad and Terrones (2003) demonstrate that increasing trade intensity contributes to increasing the 
transmission of both peaks and bottoms of the business cycles across the globe. 
Studies on business cycles in the EU, conducted in the last decade, have focused on the degree 
of  synchronization,  especially  to  ascertain  whether  the  fundamental  conditions  for  an  effective 
monetary  union  are  satisfied  by  current  Euro-zone  members  or  will  be  satisfied  by  candidate 
countries. The empirical investigations refer to correlations of output, GDP, industrial production or 
employment; in some cases, correlations of exports, consumption and services are also investigated. 
An intensifying correlation of real variables implies that the response to the shocks has become more 
symmetric  across  European  countries  –  a  characteristic  of  “optimal  currency  areas”  and  a  pre-
requisite for a successful currency zone. 
The results of empirical studies on cycle correlation show that – despite the recent emergence 
of a “world business cycle” due to globalisation – euro-area countries correlate amongst themselves 
more than with the rest of the world. Empirical studies have shown that synchronicity has increased 
not  only  within  the  euro-zone  or  the  “old”  EU  countries,  including  some  “peripheral”  countries 
(therefore making the concept of a “core” of European countries less meaningful), but also between 
“old” and “new” Europe. As regards output correlations, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia seemed to be 
the most correlated with the euro-area; the lowest correlations, close to zero, were found for the Baltic 
states (Babetskii, 2005; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006).  More recently, Darvas and Szapary (2008) 
argued that in terms of GDP (as well as imports and exports) the so-called New and Old Member States 
have become more and more synchronised. However consumption and investment cyclical dynamics 
remain unsynchronized.  
 
2.3 Impact of the recent global crisis  
The collapse  of  the  Lehman  Brothers  bank  in  the  fall of 2008  is  widely  recognised as the 
highlight  of  the  so-called  “sub-prime  crises”  in  the  US.  Actually,  many  of  the  weaknesses  of  the 
financial system had been coming to the surface since the second half of 2007, but the process was 
actually initiated by the increases in the Federal Fund rates in the USA as of late 2005. While the 
chronology of the events is both known and has been widely discussed, the real effects are still largely 
controversial.  
Firstly, the business cycle peak in the USA – as well as in other leading global economies – had 
come to a turn already in the second half of 2007. Thus, some real adjustment was to be expected even 
without the financial tornado caused by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers and subsequent bailing 
out  of  other  financial  institutions.  Secondly,  the  magnitude  of  the  real  adjustments  has  been 
surprisingly large, with unprecedented falls in production, income and international trade. In addition, 
employment declined considerably and the unemployment rates gradually rose during 2009. USA has 
noted the highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression9, while for example the Baltic States 
– along with Ukraine – experienced a 20% annual GDP contraction, which cannot be compared even to 
massive post-transition adjustments in these countries.  
                                                
9 In the US, in March 2010 it stood at 9.7%. Total unemployment rate (UR) increased in the EU to 9.6% in March 
2010 (vs. 7.1% in September 2008). The level of EU-27 unemployment reached 23.1 million in March 2010, 
compared to 20.6 of 12 months before and 16.8 million (on average) in 2008. On the other hand, the employment 
rate - the key labour market performance indicator of the European Employment Strategy - declined in 2009 (to 
64.6% vs. 65.9% in 2008).    6 
In fact, the real effects have been highly differentiated across countries. Naturally, the size of 
the shock as well as the magnitude of adjustments depend upon various factors: e.g. country reliance 
on international trade, dependence on natural resources, financial liberalization of the banking system, 
fiscal resources at government disposal and so on (see, for example, European Commission, 2009a and 
2009b). In terms of the labour market impact, the IMF (2009) investigates the different employment 
adjustments and labour hoarding phenomena with respect to previous crises. A first general result is 
that during the last crisis, there was in most countries (both advanced and emerging) a much bigger 
(negative) impact on productivity (per worker), suggesting that labour hoarding has been much higher 
(on average) during this recession10.  
From  the  perspective  of  already  8-10  quarters  after  the  peak  of  business  cycle  in  most 
developed economies, it can be observed that in some cases deterioration of the employment rate has 
been  slight,  notwithstanding  sometimes  biggest  output  reductions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  recent 
events show that “labour hoarding” incentives by the government are more common in countries 
specialised  in  industrial  activities,  where  income-support  policies  are  also  more  common.  These 
countries frequently developed crisis-specific legislation (e.g. subsidies for part-time work in Germany 
or extending income support for workers formally maintaining job contracts at reduced working-time 
or  at  "zero-hours"  in  Italy).  However,  the  fall  in  labour  demand  has  been  accompanied  by  either 
labour-hoarding practices – with consequent reductions in productivity – or a fall in labour supply (the 
“discouraged worker effect”) thus dampening down the impact on unemployment rates11.  
The opposite cases include countries where employment has been heavily cut, yielding also 
exceptionally high unemployment rates, but with smaller (or even nil) effects on productivity. The IMF 
(2009) partly explains this heterogeneity in performances by considering the multifaceted dimensions 
of  labour  market  flexibility,  such  as  employment  protection  legislation  (EPL),  the  types  of  wage-
bargaining  arrangements,  the  level  and  duration  of  unemployment  benefits  and  the  diffusion  of 
temporary  contracts.  The  stronger  employment  response  in  low  EPL  economies  with  respect  to 
medium/high EPL economies is consistent with the literature suggesting that employment protection 
reduces  both  inflows  to  and  outflows  from  employment.  For  medium/high  EPL  countries,  the 
reduction in employment during this crisis has been similar to that during previous cycles despite 
substantially bigger GDP declines, confirming the above-mentioned higher degree of labour hoarding. 
The employment-productivity adjustments path was investigated also with reference to past 
economic crises. Beegle (1999) analyses the feasibility of the intensive margins adjustment, instead of 
the  reduction  in  jobs  and  increase  in  unemployment  rates.  Moreover,  sectoral  and  regional 
reallocation of labour (e.g. workers move back to agriculture, i.e. from urban to rural areas) are usually 
important,  especially  in  developing  countries,  including  movements  into  the  informal  sector  and 
toward subsistence activities. Analysing the real effects of the financial crises in East Asia and Mexico 
                                                
10 The cyclical behaviour of unemployment during recessions and recoveries is also discussed in IMF (2010, 
chapter 3). After the crisis, the highest increases of unemployment rates (UR) in the world were recorded in 
developed  economies,  the  EU  and  the  remaining  countries  of  Europe,  while  working  poverty  dramatically 
increased in many regions (especially South East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, North Africa, and Sub Sahara 
Africa). 
11 For the next years, a further rise in the unemployment rates during 2010 is expected for European countries. A 
certain persistence of high unemployment rates, similarly to past crises, is also likely because of "hysteresis" 
phenomena that cause an upward shift in the "structural unemployment". Of course, persistence and hysteresis 
largely depend on the soundness of the recovery, also related to the adoption of macroeconomic policies and 
specific labour market policies.   7 
during the 1990s, Fallon and Lucas (2002) find that aggregate employment fell by much less than 
production and even increased in some cases (despite different sectoral and regional responses). 
Eichhorst  et  al.  (2010)  offer  a  new  explanation  of  the  different  pattern  of  adaptation  in 
European  labour  markets  during  the  last  crisis;  they  consider  the  complex  role  of  labour  market 
institutions, during a negative shock, by better incorporating in the analysis different types of “labour 
market flexibility” and also by focusing on the interactions between institutions, shocks and policies.  
In particular, they consider: (i) external numerical flexibility (dependent on EPL, the benefit system 
affecting labour supply, labour taxes); (ii) internal numerical flexibility (working time adjustments); 
(iii) external functional flexibility (occupational mobility, influenced by active labour market policies); 
(iv) internal functional flexibility (changing organization of production); (v) wage flexibility. Especially 
in  some  countries,  enterprise-level  strategies  regarding  working  time  adjustment  (often  partly 
favoured by ad-hoc policy interventions) reduced the negative impact of crisis on employment. In 
addition, in some countries this effect seems to be stronger now than in the past. 
 
3. An empirical investigation for a sample of EU countries 
Before presenting data, methodology and empirical results, we briefly illustrate some possible 
key employment-productivity dynamics in the simple but useful framework proposed by Mulligan 
(2009). The nature of the boom-slump short-term GDP evolution necessitates changes in the dynamics 
of labour demand. After passing the hike of GDP growth rate (which can only be known ex post), labour 
demand can only grow slower (or decline). However, if labour is not contained, the labour productivity 
growth rate will start to drop. Alternatively, containment of the labour demand may actually maintain 
or  even  foster  the  labour  productivity  growth  rate.  Finally,  if  there  is  both  employment  and 
productivity adjustment, there is not only a shift of the curve, but also a simultaneous movement along 
it. These choices are made at the firm level - obviously, they are conditional on existing labour market 
institutions and crisis-management policies - and may vary across sectors and industries, determining 
different cross-country joint dynamics. However, depending on which of the effects dominates, either 
job-preserving adjustment or adjustment focused on maintaining labour productivity can be observed.   
Recent policy instruments implemented in some of the EU countries have targeted either both 
or at least one of the adjustments. For example, instruments favouring labour hoarding change the 
nature of the shift, maintaining employment at the expense of productivity.  
 
3.1. Data and sample 
  We use country-level data on GDP and employment in the National Economy based on SNA 
measurement standards. Employment was measured in full time equivalent terms. Data were collected 
from Eurostat and cover the period 1990q1-2009q4 (or latest available data) and 15 EU countries. The 
selection of countries is based on data availability. The variables of interest crucial for the analysis 
comprise output and employment. Output is measured as total gross domestic product, seasonality 
and working days adjusted. Employment is based on national accounts reporting, also seasonality and 
working  days  adjusted.  However,  for  some  countries  and  some  years  both  variables  were  not 
available. Table 1 reports the total number of observations available for each country. 
Labour productivity is computed for each country as GDP over employment. This measure of 
labour productivity is far from ideal in many respects. Conceptually, it should be defined as output per 
hour of work, but the number of hours worked is unavailable for most of the European countries.   8 
Resorting to total employment as a proxy is naturally a second-best option for two main reasons: (i) it 
does not permit comparison of intensive versus extensive margin adjustments and (ii) in the case of 
considerable  changes  in  the  number  of  hours  worked  (e.g.  large-scale  shorter  working  time 
regulations implementation), the measure naturally underestimates the scale of adjustment. On the 
other  hand,  in  the  approach  followed  in  our  study,  the  crucial  element  is  to  analyse  changes  in 
productivity and demand for labour using the same categories for all countries. 
 
Table 1. Size of sample by country 
Country  Beginning of sample  End of sample  Total no. of observations 
Belgium  1990q1  2009q4  80 
Czech Republic  1995q1  2009q4  60 
Denmark  1990q1  2009q4  80 
Estonia  1995q1  2009q3  59 
Finland  1990q1  2009q4  80 
France  1990q1  2009q3  79 
Germany  1991q2  2009q4  75 
Hungary  1995q1  2009q4  60 
Italy  1990q1  2009q2  78 
Latvia  1995q1  2009q4  60 
Lithuania  1995q1  2009q4  60 
Netherlands  1990q1  2009q3  79 
Poland  1995q1  2009q4  58 
Spain  1990q1  2009q4  80 
United Kingdom  1992q2  2009q3  70 
Source: Eurostat. Note: For the Czech Republic only data from the labour force survey were available. In the case 
of  France,  employment  based  on  System  of  National  Accounts  was  no  longer  reported  as  of  2003,  and  we 
therefore  used  the  labour  force  survey  data.  Employment  data  is not  available  for  1999q2  and  1999q3  for 
Poland.  If  seasonality  and  working  days  adjusted  data  were  unavailable  (three  additional  countries),  the 
procedure of adjusting for seasonality was implemented using Tramo/Seats procedure, with the assistance of 
Demetra. 
 
Moreover, the very way of defining labour productivity as a ratio between output and amount 
of  labour  used  is  also  controversial.  There  has  been  a  long  debate  in  empirical  studies  on  the 
alternative measures, cf. Bernard and Jones (1996). Some studies tend to suggest that either gross 
value  added  or  estimated  marginal  product  of  labour  should  be  used  instead.  However,  the  very 
estimation of MPL remains troublesome, with different functional forms yielding varied estimates of 
MPL and MPL changes, as analysed in Growiec (2009). In addition, such applied definition of labour 
productivity is widespread in the business cycle analyses.  
 
3.2. Analytical strategy 
  To observe the nature of the adjustment in the selected EU countries, three necessary steps 
had to be followed: 
1.  identify the “peak” quarters to determine the “anchor” location; 
2.  compute  the  “anchored”  changes  in  labour  productivity  and  employment  for  each  of  the 
“peaks” and for each of the countries in the sample. 
In order to identify the “peaks”, we have implemented Hodrick-Prescott filtering to logs of seasonally 
adjusted GDP time series.    9 
There is a long and heated debate in the literature on the use of the HP filter as opposed to 
Baxter and King (1999) or Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) filters, cf. Kaiser and Maravall (2001)12. 
The  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  is  quite  simple  to  implement;  however,  it  also  has  potentially  large 
drawbacks, namely it significantly distorts the higher moments of the data – a point discussed by King 
and Rebello (1993) and Cogley and Nason (1995). However, the actual reliability of filtering is of 
secondary importance in our study as long as the timing of the events is not distorted. In recent Monte 
Carlo simulation, Corbae and Ouiliaris (2006) have demonstrated that while the alternative filters 
differ in the value of trend departure, in fact they suggest essentially the same moments13. In total, we 
have identified 51 “peaks” in the sample, but the employment data coverage allows only 42 of them to 
be analysed. Table 2 reports the number of analysed “peaks” for each of the countries in the sample. 
 
Table 2. Number of peaks by country14  
Country  No of peaks in sample  Peaks   identified 
Belgium  3  1992q1,  2000q4 
Czech Republic  2  1998q2,  2007q3 
Denmark  2  2000q4,  2008q2 
Estonia  2  1997q4,  2007q4 
Finland  3  1990q4, 1998q2, 2007q4 
France  3  1992q1, 2001q1, 2008q1 
Germany  3  1995q3, 2002q1, 2008q2 
Hungary  2  1998q1, 2008q1 
Italy  3  1992q1, 1996q1, 2001q1 
Latvia  2  1997q4, 2008q1 
Lithuania  2  1997q4, 2008q2 
Netherlands  3  1992q1, 2001q1, 2008q1 
Poland  2  2000q2, 2008q1 
Spain  3  1992q1, 2001q1, 2007q4 
United Kingdom  2  1999q3, 2008q1 
Source: own computation based on Eurostat 
 
For each of the identified peaks and for both crucial time series – employment and labour 
productivity – we have computed cumulative changes as anchored to the quarter of peak over the 
window of eight consecutive  quarters15.  Thus,  the  analysed  dynamics  are  not  annual or  quarterly 
dynamics, but the cumulative changes from the best economy performance up to two years later. The 
window – eight quarters – has been chosen for two main reasons. First of all, in the sample this was 
roughly an average duration from “peak” to “bottom”. Secondly, the economic situation later than 8 
                                                
12 The Hodrick-Prescott filter estimates trend by smoothing – in effect, by taking a weighted moving average of 
the  original  series,  where  the  moving  average  is  symmetric  and  centred.  In  practice,  one  must  choose  how 
smooth the resulting trend should be. Hodrick and Prescott (1997) suggest a smoothness parameter of 1600 for 
quarterly data, and that parameter value is most commonly used in practical applications. 
13 In fact, using other filters has not altered the identification of “peak” quarters. Filtering was performed with 
standard λ=1600 and without any additional modifications. 
14  Please  consult  the  Appendix  for  the  graphical  representations  of  the  cyclical  properties  of  GDP  for  each 
country in the sample. 
15 In some cases eight quarters of data were not available. In such instances, all the latest available data were 
used.    10 
quarters from the “peak” is only rarely driven by the same initial impulse resulting in real economy 
adjustments.  
 
3.3. Intuition Behind the Empirical Approach 
Theory  on  business  cycles  (RBC)  predicts  that  the  adjustment  should  follow  a  backbone 
pattern, with possibly initial continuation of the growing employment, but a fairly prompt transition 
towards productivity increase and employment reduction should be expected16. On the other hand, 
labour market rigidities are consistent with little initial adjustment in employment and thus obvious 
productivity reductions (i.e. labour hoarding) followed only subsequently by a contraction in labour 
demand. 
In our sample, virtually all events of “peaks” overlap within the boundaries of one year (4 
quarters). Thus, we restrain from identifying directly the “peaks” and “crises”, focusing rather on the 
waves across Europe. These included the wave of the late 1990s (“peaks” within 1997q4 and 1998q4; 
7 countries), early 2000s (“peaks” within 2000q1 and 2001q1; 10 countries) and the recent events 
(“peaks” within 2007q1 and 2008q1; 14 countries). In addition, there were isolated cases of additional 
shorter (and also smaller) cyclical departures in the case of Denmark, Finland and France. We thus 
(mainly) focus on the following three cases: late 1990s, early 2000s and late 2000s.  
We analyse the cumulated changes in employment and labour productivity, where the base for 
comparison  is  always  the  “peak”  quarter.  In  order  to  facilitate  the  comparisons  across  time  and 
countries, the series were additionally logarithmised. In the remainder of the paper we always portray 
the most recent crisis in green, the crisis of the early 2000s (or the previous one, as indicated) in red 
and earlier events in blue (or brown). Graphical representation permits comparison of both the type 
and magnitude of the change.  
The severity of the economic slowdown differs significantly across EU countries. While the 
majority of EU Member States experienced negative GDP growth rates (with Poland being the only 
exception so far), the Baltic countries experienced two-digit reductions in annual GDP growth, while 
the EU-27 outcomes reached -4.1% in 2009 and are forecasted to increase to 0.7% in 2010. Since the 
severity of the crisis differs across the countries - interacting with partly different labour market 
institutions  and  policies  -  the  scale  and  shape  of  employment-productivity  adjustments  were 
significantly different (between countries or clusters of countries). Moreover, transition countries are 
typically  characterised  by  larger  responses  to  the  initial  impulses  (shock).  Thus,  the  observed 
adjustment patterns are likely to be diverse. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Analysis  reveals  that  the  EU  countries  more  frequently  corresponded  to  the  "typical"  real 
business cycle (RBC) pattern in the 1990s (solid grey lines) as well as – for a majority of countries – in 
the late 1990s or early 2000s (dashed black lines). However, more recent adjustments frequently 
depart  from  this  theoretical  prediction  (solid  black  lines).  We  can  find  four  main  patterns  of 
adjustments after the last crisis:  
                                                
16 In fact, this is the pattern followed currently by the US economy, which suggests the observed slowdown – 
irrespectively  of  the  additional  adverse  contributions  from  the  financial  sector  –  was  originally  a  real  type 
adjustment.    
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(a)  a  canonical  reduction  in  employment  together  with  an  increase  in  productivity, 
consistently with RBC theory;  
(b)  reduced  (or  absent)  change  in  employment  –  because  of  the  key  role  of  “labour 
hoarding” – together with reductions in productivity; 
(c) a contemporaneous reduction in both productivity and employment, consistent with 
profound economic changes and recession (beyond standard RBC approach); 
(d) a growth or preservation of both employment and productivity, suggesting only minor 
real adjustment in the economies. 
We  discuss  these  four  patterns  below.  The  four  groups  of  countries  have  been  identified  with 
reference to the adjustment pattern followed after the last crisis.  
As  already  mentioned  the  reduction  in employment  associated  with  an  increase  in  labour 
productivity has been observed in the US economy and is to a large extent independent of the financial 
turmoil. As discussed by Mulligan, the adjustments started already in the second half of 2007. For the 
European countries, however, this pattern has only been followed by two economies: Hungary and, to 
a greater extent, Spain (Figure 1). While typically Eastern European countries are characterised by 
much  greater  volatility  of  the  labour  market  indicators,  here  Spain  is  a  country  with  a  higher 
magnitude of adjustment. In total the employment was reduced by 5% in Hungary and 10% in Spain, 
but the accompanying growth in productivity has been comparable in the two countries. Interestingly, 
while the origin of the Hungarian economic slowdown involved an external adverse shock coupled 
with  fiscal  imbalances,  the  main  source  of  Spanish  difficulties  emerged  from  the  real  estate  and 
construction sector bubble of the past decade. The huge employment destruction in Spain has been 
favoured by the existence of a high share (more than 30%) of temporary-contract employment which - 
in fact - declined by more than 20% following the last crisis.  
 
Figure 1. Countries with canonical adjustment pattern of type (a) 
 
Note: solid black line (late 2000s); dashed black line (late 1990s for Hungary and early 1990s for Spain)  
 
It is also interesting to note that the earlier “recession” experiences of these two countries did 
not  differ,  since  an  increase  in  productivity  was  accompanied  by  a  contemporaneous  growth  in 
employment. As regards the surprising dynamics of the latter variable, it should be noted that the 
Spanish adjustments of the early 1990s (the peak was identified at 1992q1) started a long period of 
prevailing  net  job  creation  (improving  a  very  low  initial  employment  rate),  while  the  Hungarian 
experience at the end of the 1990s (the peak was identified at 1998q1, in the aftermath of the so-called   12 
“Russian” crisis) was conditioned by a dominant trend of net job creation after the huge negative 
employment decline of the first years of transition.  
In addition to Hungary and Spain, after the initial period of “labour hoarding”, the canonical 
RBC pattern also occurred in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – they seem 
to follow a typical adjustment pattern, but only after a few quarters. While the absolute recovery of 
productivity is for the time being only observable in Denmark, the other three countries seem to have 
entered the path of employment reduction and productivity growth.  
It should be noted that huge differences with respect to previous crises for all countries of this 
group emerge from the graphs: in fact, during past crises the well-known ability of these economies to 
create jobs was maintained also in bad times, probably due to the positive role of their labour market 
institutions. The worst impact of the last crisis, compared to previous crises, can be partly explained, at 
least in some cases, by the different size of the downturn interacting with a low "internal" flexibility17.  
 
Figure 2. Countries with adjustment eventually replicating the pattern of type (a) 
 
Note: solid black line (late 2000s); dashed black line (early 2000s); grey dashed and solid lines (1990s)  
 
As  is  well  known,  Denmark,  Finland  and  the  Netherlands  are  characterised  by  highly 
innovative  labour  market  institutions,  including  the  advanced  flexicurity  instruments  (especially 
Denmark and the Netherlands) and additional, quasi-automatic stabilisers (as in the case of the Finish 
Employment Fund). In the past, these countries were able to maintain employment constant or even 
with a moderate growth, subsequent to the business cycle peak. The exceptional scale of employment 
                                                
17 See Eichhorst et al. (2010) and section 2.3.   13 
adjustment in Finland – but also in Denmark – seems to suggest that the current shock experienced by 
these economies has been.  
On the other hand, the UK was able to preserve employment levels in the past thanks to a 
flexible labour market, characterised by relatively low constraints on firing and hiring; however, over 
the past two decades it has also developed a wide system of “active” labour market instruments and 
institutions, similarly to the Netherlands and Denmark.18 The case of the UK – where the cumulated 
reduction in employment and productivity reaches roughly 2% - is in fact surprising. This country 
should in principle follow closely the pattern observed in the US. A possible explanation is that over 
the recent past both GDP and employment grew in the UK almost constantly. The employment level 
has changed from roughly 21.5 mln to 25.5 mln (or over 25%) in only 15 years. At the same time, this 
country  has  been  characterised by relatively  intense immigration and internationally open  labour 
market. The decrease in both productivity and employment may thus be explained by a combination of 
the migration outflow and type (b) or very weak type (a) adjustment patterns.  
Since the adjustments in Germany and the Netherlands are of relatively small magnitude, these 
countries seem to be a border case between type (a) and type (b) adjustments. The typical examples of 
the  latter  are  France  and  Italy.  The  currently  observed  processes  involve  predominantly  the 
maintenance of employment, even at the expense of productivity. It should also be noted that this form 
of adjustment is new for Germany, which previously followed a typical RBC pattern.  
 
Figure 3. Countries with adjustment pattern of type (b) 
 
 
Note: solid black line (late 2000s); dashed black line (early 2000s); grey line (1990s)    
                                                
18 In fact, the UK followed a path similar to Spain and Hungary in the previous crisis (the peak was identified at 
1999q3).   14 
 
France  and  Italy  are  considered  to  constitute  the  examples  of  the  so-called  “Southern 
European” labour market model.  Namely, they are both characterised by relatively low participation 
and  employment  rates  and  high  entry  barriers,  especially  for  youth.  At  the  same  time,  they  are 
relatively highly unionised. Observing the adjustment patterns in these two countries, it is surprising 
to note that the relationship between productivity and employment has actually been quite similar in 
these countries. In fact, the business cycles of both these countries are fairly synchronised (crises 
occurring on roughly the same dates).  
Germany,  France  and  Italy  used  and  increased  their  "internal  flexibility"  with  significant 
reductions in hours worked induced by policy interventions in the so-called “crisis packages” of these 
countries.  Aiming  to  minimize  employment  reductions,  these  policy  instruments  proved  strongly 
detrimental to productivity.  
The  third  group  consists  of  countries  where  adverse  huge  employment  adjustment  is 
accompanied by a decrease in productivity. This group comprises the three Baltic countries – the most 
heavily hit EU economies. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania experienced a two-digit reduction in GDP, 
which is by far the largest crisis since the onset of the economic transition. As a consequence of fairly 
flexible labour markets, the impact on employment has also been considerable. It should be noted that 
this huge job shock is the second one (the previous one occurred in the first years of transition) in less 
than a generation. 
 




Note: solid black line (late 2000s); dashed black line (early 2000s); grey line (late 1990s)      15 
 
As  regards  past  crises,  the  Baltic  States  seem  to  have  followed  a  typical  neoclassical 
adjustment. Estonia and Lithuania would classify as type (a) patterns, while the type (b) pattern in the 
case of Latvia may be explained by relatively mild economic crises in previous years. However, the 
observed puzzle may be justified by the following observation: the reduction in employment observed 
in  the  Baltic  States  –  in  the  strikingly  high  accumulated  magnitude  of  10%-20%  in  total  –  is  a 
consequence not so much of a recession, but rather of a collapse of the economy. For a relatively small 
economy – the populations of these countries range between 2 and 4 million citizens – a drop in the 
size of the economy by one fifth is a shock that cannot be absorbed without negative adjustments in 
both productivity and employment.  
 
Figure 5. Countries with adjustment pattern of type (d) 
 
Note: solid black line (late 2000s); dashed black line (early 2000s) 
 
The final type of adjustment involves contemporaneous increases in both productivity and 
employment.  This  group  –  quite  exotic  in  composition  –  comprises  Belgium,  Czech  Republic  and 
Poland. In general, such behaviour is actually contrary to the predictions of any crisis theory – let alone 
the RBC approach – and seems to suggest that there is no economic crisis. In fact, of these three 
countries, Poland maintained positive GDP growth rates, while the recessions in both Belgium and 
Czech Republic have been relatively moderate. Moreover, these three countries seem to conform to the 
canonical RBC patterns in the periods of more pronounced economic slowdown. The earlier crises 
demonstrated the increase of productivity and the reduction of employment, although the magnitude 
of adjustment is much lower in the case of Belgium.    16 
Summarising,  although  the  adjustment  patterns  across  countries  seem  to  be  highly 
heterogeneous and even divergent, there appear to be four main adjustment patterns. In addition, it is 
very interesting to highlight that the employment-productivity dynamics occurred in past crises often 
differed from the dynamics during the last crisis. 
 
4. Conclusions  
  The objective of this paper was to verify whether the current crisis has any peculiarities in the 
way productivity-employment adjustments have taken place. The typical RBC approach suggests that 
the  post-peak  adjustment  should  involve  reductions  in  employment  accompanied  by  increases  in 
productivity.   Such a pattern was  followed  in  the  US over the  recent crisis, which  prompts some 
researchers – among them Casey Mulligan – to claim that in fact the current economic recession is 
rooted in real, rather than financial reasons.  
We have produced empirical evidence on different adjustment patterns among the EU Member 
States in terms of productivity-employment adjustment. In fact, the paper identifies highly diverse 
adjustment paths. We analysed the first 6-8 quarters after the peak of the economic performance. We 
considered the past two decades of data, identifying for each country between two and three such 
events. In all of the identified countries the “peak” quarter happened before the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and the adjustment was not accompanied initially by any crisis-oriented policy packages.  
This comparison permitted organisation of the adjustment paths into groups – coherent within 
and  different  from  each  other.  A  comparison  of  adjustment  patterns  over  time  and  across  the 
institutional frameworks highlights two types of peculiarity. The first is associated with the atypical 
adjustments in many European countries over the recent crisis. The second encompasses the positive 
or detrimental role the institutions and policies may play in absorbing the consequences of a global 
economic crisis.  
Our findings are consistent with the conclusions of Eichhorst et al. (2010) who use different 
methodology, but also yield policy implications based on a cross-country comparison of the crisis 
response and policy response among EU Members. Similarly to the US adjustment pattern, a reduction 
in employment together with an increase in productivity, consistent with RBC theory, occurred only in 
Hungary and Spain. France, Italy and Germany formed a second group, where the currently observed 
processes involve predominantly maintenance of employment at the expense of productivity.  
In a second group of countries consisting of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, a short joint decline in both employment and productivity is followed by an adjustment 
pattern of RBC type. Although the current employment response in these countries is unprecedented 
in terms of magnitude, it can be partly explained by the severity of the current shock as well as the 
historical evolution of employment.  
The  Baltic  States  –  Estonia,  Latvia  and  Lithuania  –  are  the  third  group.  An  adverse  huge 
employment adjustment is accompanied by a very strong decrease in productivity. These economies 
experienced a two-digit reduction in GDP during the last crisis while the recent major shock is the 
second one within less than a generation.  
For the rest of the countries analysed in our study – Belgium, Czech Republic and Poland – the 
typical adjustment pattern in the case of the crisis is consistent with RBC, but currently both increase 
in employment and productivity is observed. In fact, Poland maintains positive GDP growth rates, 
while the recession in both Belgium and the Czech Republic is relatively moderate.   17 
The employment-productivity adjustments in the countries adopting the "flexicurity model" – 
based on "external flexibility" and effective active and passive labour policies – were every bit as 
positive as in the past. Employment dynamics were more favourable in the countries taking advantage 
of  higher  "internal  flexibility"  and  related  policies,  which  permitted  a  flexible  reduction  in  hours 
worked  with  minor  job  destructions,  i.e.  “labour  hoarding”.  However,  the  price  paid  in  terms  of 
productivity  reduction  was  very  high,  reaching  4-6  percentage  points  in  just  6-8  quarters. 
Consequently, it seems that accompanying the “external flexibility” measures with “internal flexibility” 
practices offers greater chances for swift recovery of satisfactory labour market performances without 
penalizing the productivity dynamics. It is also crucial, however, to design instruments in response to 
the actually observed processes, suited to the country at hand.    18 
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Appendix 
 
Figure A1 – Identifying the “peak” quarters for the analysed countries   21   22 
 
Note: Typically, series for GDP were longer than for employment. Thus, not all of the identified peaks could be 
analysed. 
 
 